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Abstract : A supply management system governs Canada’s poultry sector. Tariff Rate Quotas 
(TRQs), with prohibitive above-quota tariffs and low in-quota tariff, mimic import-quotas limit 
international competition in Canada’s poultry market. The quota part of the TRQs is a minimum 
access commitment under international trade agreement that is defined as a fraction of domestic 
production. We show in a 3-stage game involving negotiations between retailers and processors 
and between processors and farms that increasing minimum access commitment under current 
trade agreements can produce Metzler effects with larger price increases observed at the farm 
and processing levels. Simulations based on 2008 data support the Metzler paradox and shed 
light on import license allocations between retailers and poultry processors in Canada. 
 
Résumé:  Le  secteur  de  la  volaille  est  soumis  à  une  politique  de  gestion  de  l’offre.  Des 
contingents  tarifaires,  avec  des  tarifs  hors-quota  prohibitifs  et  de  faibles  tarifs  sur  les 
importations à l’intérieur des contingents limitent la concurrence sur le marché canadien. Les 
contingents sont des accès minimum négociés dans le cadre d’ententes internationales qui sont 
spécifiés comme des fractions du marché interne.  Par le biais d’un jeu à trois étapes, nous 
démontrons que des élargissements des accès minimum tels que spécifiés actuellement peuvent 
causer des effets Metzler, c’est-à-dire des augmentations de prix. Celles-ci sont plus élevées à la 
ferme et au niveau de la transformation. Des simulations basées sur des données pour 2008 
illustrent la plausibilité d’observer le paradoxe de Metzler et l’importance de l’allocation des 
permis d’importation entre producteurs et transformateurs.  
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…for Canada the most politically sensitive issue [in the Doha Round] is supply management in 
dairy and poultry 
Mike Gifford (2005)  
Canada’s former chief agricultural trade negotiator 
 
1. Introduction 
Market access for agricultural products has been a main issue of contention in agricultural trade 
negotiations.  In  the  Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral  negotiations,  World  Trade  Organization 
(WTO) members agreed on a process of tariffication of non-tariff barriers. Because too many of 
the proposed tariffs were prohibitive and that exporters wanted to at least maintain historical 
market access levels, tariff-rate-quotas (TRQs) emerged as a necessary compromise. Under a 
TRQ, an import volume defined as a minimum access commitment is taxed at an “in-quota” 
tariff  rate  while  any  additional  imports  are  taxed  at  an  “over-quota”  rate.  The  goal  of  the 
tariffication process was to assure a 5% minimum market access to imports after 2004 for all 
countries member of the WTO. Thus, the quota portion of a TRQ is set to a minimum of 5% of 
the  domestic  production.  In  July  2010,  there  were  more  than  1,100  different  TRQs  for 
agricultural products covering more than 6,000 tariff lines. In some cases, the in-quota and the 
over-quota tariff rates are the same, making the quota irrelevant. In some rare cases, like the 
imports of some rice products by South Korea, the over-quota tariff is lower than the in-quota 
tariff. However, most TRQs have an over-quota tariff that is much higher than the in-quota tariff. 
In fact, many TRQs have a prohibitive over-quota tariff rate, making the TRQs equivalent to the 
import quotas they replaced. 
  WTO members have disagreed in the Doha Round of negotiations on the liberalization of 
so-called “sensitive” products protected by TRQs. One proposal is that in exchange for less 
aggressive tariff reductions, sensitive products would be subject to increases in minimum access 
commitment. For TRQs set up to replicate import quotas, the expansion of the minimum access 
commitment means that a larger share of the domestic production can be imported. This paper is 
concerned with the consequences of such expansion on domestic production, domestic prices and 
welfare  when  domestic  production  is  imperfectly  competitive.  We  demonstrate  that  TRQ 
liberalization  forcing  a  larger  share  of  the  domestic  production  to  be  imported  can  trigger 
domestic price increases. This peculiar domestic price response is known in the literature as the 
Metzler paradox in honor of the pioneering work of Lloyd Metzler (1949a,b). Metzler showed 
that the imposition of a tariff can lower the domestic price. In a partial equilibrium setting, this 4 
can occur when a large importing country faces a backward-bending foreign export supply curve. 
Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (1998, p. 212-214) show that the paradox also arises in 
general equilibrium models when the offer curve of the country trading with the tariff-imposing 
country is backward bending. The paradox also arises for the imports of an inferior good. Other 
contexts may yield to a Metzler paradox. For instance, Helpman and Razin (1978) show that a 
tariff  need  not  protect  the  import-competing  sector  under  uncertainty  and  in  the  absence  of 
international trade in securities. Panagariya (1982) show that the Metzler paradox can arise in a 
general  equilibrium  model  when  the  import-competing  sector  is  monopolized.  Benson  and 
Hartigan (1983)  show that Metzler effects can arise in a spatial oligopoly setting if demand takes 
a  positive  exponential  form.  Ishikawa  and  Mukunoki  (2008)  use  a  three-country  regional 
integration model with monopolized production and rising marginal revenues to uncover Metzler 
effects.  
  Clearly, the Metzler paradox is a theoretical possibility supported by different conditions. 
However, no case of a Metzler paradox has been empirically demonstrated yet (p. 168 in Bowen, 
Hollander and Viane 1998). We show that the WTO’s tariffication of non-tariff barriers into 
TRQs  that  link  market  access  commitment  to  domestic  production  and  agricultural  policies 
aimed  at  securing  market  power  to  upstream  primary  producers,  like  Canada’s  supply 
management  policy,  can  induce  Metzler  effects.  We  use  simulations  for  Canada’s  poultry 
industry to gauge how large Metzler effects might be and the extent by which they are robust to 
changes in the distribution of import licenses and other elements affecting negotiations between 
farmers  (producers),  processors  and  retailers.  Canada’s  poultry  industry  is  most  interesting 
because domestic production has been growing steadily with little effective domestic support 
even though it has been operating under supply management and restrictive quotas/TRQs for 
several decades.
1 
  Our  model  considers  a  three-stage  industry.  The  price  paid  to  farmers  is  negotiated 
between farmers and processors in the first stage. The second stage concerns the determination 
of the domestic production and imports because the minimum access commitment is set as a 
fraction  of  domestic  production.  In  the  third  stage,  a  distinguishing  feature  of  our  model, 
                                                 
1 Until 2004, the OECD was reporting producer support estimates (PSEs) and consumer support estimates (CSEs) 
for different commodities and countries. For 1999-2004, the average percentage PSEs for Canadian poultry and milk 
were respectively 3% and 57% (OECD 2005). 
.  5 
domestic processors and retailers bargain over the wholesale price. We calibrate our model to 
replicate past prices and quantities. TRQ liberalization in the form of imports representing a 
larger fraction of domestic production induces increases in domestic prices when import rents are 
part  of  the  negotiations  between  retailers,  processors  and  farmers.  These  results  are  most 
interesting for two reasons. First, they contrast most vividly with conventional priors regarding 
the effects of market liberalization.  Second, the Canadian government has become increasingly 
isolated in its attempt to shield supply-managed industries from trade liberalization at the WTO 
and seems determined to make concessions on market access commitments to maintain high 
over-quota tariffs (WTO 2008). 
The  next  section  describes  the  institutions  governing  the  marketing  of  domestic  and 
imported  chicken  in  Canada.  We  focus  on  the interactions  between  retailers,  processors  and 
farmers along the supply chain. The third section features a theoretical model to analyze how the 
expansion of minimum access commitment under a TRQ and how the distribution of import 
licenses affects domestic production and the total quantity marketed. The fourth section shows 
simulations of TRQ liberalization outcomes under different assumptions about import license 
allocation and the structure of the negotiations between firms in the supply chain. Finally, the 
last section summarizes our results and their policy implications. 
 
2. The Institutions Governing Supply Management 
A supply management system governs Canada chicken production since 1979. The purpose of 
the policy is to restrict domestic production and imports to increase and stabilize prices and 
revenues of Canadian chicken producers. TRQs replaced import quotas for Canadian imports of 
chicken after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations in 1995. These TRQs are 
characterized by high over-quota tariffs rates in excess of 200% and low in-quota tariff rates to 
replicate the import quotas they replaced. The minimum access commitment portion of the TRQs 
is  managed  with  import  licenses  that  are  allocated  between  firms  at  different  stages  of 
production.  
Supply  management  is  a  simple  theoretical  concept  but  its  implementation  is  often 
complex. In the Canadian chicken industry, some elements of supply management are under 
different jurisdictions and the system involves large downstream processing and retailing firms. 
In what follows, we describe how quantities of live chicken and prices along the supply chain are 6 
determined. We also discuss the allocation of import licenses. This description of the institutions 
motivates the structure of our theoretical and simulation models.  
 
2.1. Production 
Chicken Farmers of Canada (CFC) was created in 1978 under the Farm Products Agencies Act 
with  the  stated  goal  “To  build  a  strong,  competitive,  consumer-centered  Canadian  chicken 
industry that meets the challenges of a changing world, and to profitably grow its position as the 
protein leader in Canada.” The CFC board of directors is composed of 14 industry members. 
Chicken producers have 10 provincial representatives to protect their interests, including the 
Chair  of  the  CFC  board.  Two  representatives  of  the  Canadian  Poultry  and  Egg  Processors 
Council (CPEPC), one representative of the Further Poultry Processors Association of Canada 
(FPPAC)  and  one  representative  of  the  Canadian  Restaurant  and  Foodservices  Association 
(CRFA) complete the board of directors. 
Since 1994, the production of chicken in Canada is coordinated by a so-called “bottom-
up” approach.
2 The bottom-up approach first requires the CFC to survey provincial commodity 
boards about their desired quantity of chicken. At the same time, other industry stakeholders 
such as the CPEPC and the FPPAC consult their members and then present their desired quantity 
to the CFC Board. Production quotas are approved by CFC by a double majority vote every 8 
weeks.
3 Table 1 shows the desired quantities by the CFC and the CPEPC, the domestic allocation 
approved by the CFC board and the domestic production between period A-66 (June 26 and 
August 20, 2005) and period A-89 (January 4 and February 28, 2009). The desired quantities by 
the CFC and the domestic allocations are always larger than the desired quantity by the CPEPC. 
During the period covered by Table 1, the domestic allocation was on average 1.7% larger than 
the  CPEPC  desired  allocation.  The  CPEPC  has  formulated  complaints  to  the  National  Farm 
Products Council over the domestic allocation voted by the CFC Board with the objective of 
bringing about a review of the current method under which domestic production is set (Farm 
Products Council of Canada 2009). 
                                                 
2 Prior to 1994, a “top-down” approach was used. Under that approach, the CFC allocated the national quota to 
provincial marketing boards which in turn allocated provincial quotas to individual producers.  
3 Specifically, each quota allocation must be approved by more than 50% of the board members present at the 
moment of the vote and the quota allocation must be approved by members accounting for at least 50% of the total 
domestic production of chicken.  7 
The  CFC  allocates  production  quotas  at  the  provincial  level  based  on  the  desired 
quantities  of  each  province,  on  historical  market  shares  and  by  following  rules  that  limit 
production growth in all of Canada and in each province. Provincial boards are responsible for 
the allocation of quotas to individual producers.  
 
2.2. The price of live chicken 
Provincial  marketing  boards  determine  the  price  paid  to  farmers  for  live  chicken  in  each 
province. The price paid to Ontario farmers serves as a basis for setting the price paid to farmers 
in other provinces. Since May of 2003, the price of live chicken in Ontario is determined by a 
“live price formula”. The formula has three components: producer margin, feed cost, and chick 
cost. The price is adjusted for changes in feed and chick costs every quota period. The producers 
and processors negotiate every six quotas periods over the producer margin portion of the price. 
If an agreement cannot be reached, arbitration takes place.
4  
 
2.3. The wholesale and retail prices of chicken 
The market determines chicken prices at the wholesale and retail levels. Chicken producers are 
represented  by  national  and  provincial  organizations  when  it  comes  to  the  determination  of 
quantities and prices upstream. Farmers in each province sell chicken to a handful of processors 
and there is little trade between provinces. Downstream, a few large integrated firms dominate 
the  distribution  and  retail  markets.  Retail  in  Canada  is  dominated  by  four  grocery  chains: 
Loblaw, Sobeys, Safeway, and Métro.
5 Fulton and Tang (1999) found evidence of departure 
from perfect competition in the chicken retailing and processing sectors in Canada, but they were 
not  able  to  determine  who  among  processors  and  retailers  can  harness  that  market  power. 
Gervais  and  Devadoss  (2006)  measured  the  bargaining  power  of  processors  and  farmers  in 
                                                 
4 Before May of 2003, the price paid to Ontario producers  was determined by a bargaining process involving 
representatives of the Ontario chicken marketing board and representatives from the Ontario processing industry. 
The price was set after production quotas were known. When bargaining failed, an arbitrator selected one of the 
party’s final offers. Arbitration was often required which motivated the implementation of a new mechanism to 
determine the price of live chicken in Ontario. Gervais, Guillemette and Romain (2007) find that the new system 
yields higher expected utility for processing firms, but lower expected utility for farmers. 
5 Harrison and Rude (2004) report that the average CR4 for chicken processing in all of Canada was in excess of 
60% during the 1990s. From Table IV in Lambert, Criner and Rancourt (2004), we calculate a CR4 of 61% for 
Canadian grocery stores.   8 
negotiations over the price of live chicken in Ontario between March 1997 and December 2002 
and found asymmetric weights favoring processors. 
 
2.4. Imports controls 
Import controls are necessary for supply management programs. Imports of live chicken and 
poultry meat are limited by TRQs. The minimum access commitment for chicken in Canada 
under the WTO is 39,844 metric tons, but the larger commitment under the North American Free 
Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA)  of  7.5%  of  the  previous  year’s  domestic  production  takes 
precedence. The in-quota preferential tariff for fresh, chilled or frozen poultry meat and edible 
offal is zero under several trade agreements, including NAFTA. The most favored nation in-
quota tariff under GATT varies between 4% and 8% depending on the type of chicken products. 
The over-quota tariff on imports of meat and edible offal of poultry fresh, chilled or frozen is 
238% regardless of origin (Canada Border Service, 2008). The over-quota tariff is prohibitive 
and no chicken enters Canada at the over-quota tariff. Huff, Meilke, and Amedei (2000) find that 
the tariff that would have preserved the average level of imports between 1995 and 1999 based 
on United States prices was 28.3%. 
Table 2 shows Canadian imports between 2001 and 2007. The size of import licenses 
issued has varied to keep the import-production ratio close to the 7.5% level agreed upon under 
NAFTA.
 6 Canada issues supplementary import permits to prevent product shortages or for re-
exportation. These supplementary import permits allow firms to import chicken at the in-quota 
tariff rate. As Table 2 shows, the quantity of chicken imported under  supplementary import 
permits has steadily increased between 2001 and 2007. However, most of these supplementary 
import permits were issued for re-exportation, meaning that the importing firms agreed to export 
the same volume of processed chicken.
7  
 
                                                 
6 TRQs at the WTO are set as a fraction of domestic consumption while TRQs for chicken under NAFTA are 
defined as a fraction of domestic production. These two methods are equivalent. Defining consumption C as the sum 








.  Thus, 
despite different semantics, NAFTA and WTO TRQs settings are equivalent.    
7 The import for re-exportation scheme is motivated by Canadian preferences for white chicken meat over dark 
chicken meat which contrasts with the greater appreciation of dark meat in other countries (Huff, Meilke, and 
Amedei, 2000).  9 
3. A Model of Canada’s Chicken Industry 
The model in this section is a simple representation of the institutions and policies described in 
the  previous  section.  Yet,  because  the  model  considers  retailers-processors  and  processors-
farmers (producers) interactions,  it provides new insights about supply-managed supply chains. 
To  keep  the  model  tractable,  we  assume  that  farmers,  processors  and  retailers  are  each 
represented by a single entity. The simulation model in the next section relaxes this assumption, 
but the results derived in this section are qualitatively robust. Our three-stage model considers 
that: 1) the price paid to the farmer is negotiated between the farmer and the processor in the first 
stage; 2) domestic production is determined in the second stage; and 3) the price received by the 
processor is the outcome of a processor-retailer negotiation in the third stage. We solve the 
model by backward induction. 
We rely on the Nash (1953) solution to approximate a game in which buyers and sellers 
bargain  by  making  alternating  offers  and  in  which  the  bargaining  power  of  an  agent  is 
determined  by  haggling  cost  (Rubinstein  1982).  The  cost  of  haggling  for  farmers  may  be 
important because of the perishable nature of chicken and storage costs. For retailers, the cost of 
haggling may come from the cost of having to ration consumers. The Nash solution is meant to 
characterize the outcome of an unspecified bargaining game without having to describe the game 
itself. The Nash solution implies absence of delay. Given that chicken is perishable and that the 
negotiations  are  conducted  on  a  frequent  basis,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  negotiations 
always succeed. Because domestic production must be sold on the domestic market under a 
supply management policy, there is no outside value to processors.  
  The  Nash  bargaining  solution  is  conditioned  by  threat  points  that  correspond  to  the 
profits of players in the event of failed negotiations. We assume that the threat point of the 
processor is zero when bargaining with the retailer for the price of eviscerated chicken because 
the processor must go through the retailer to market chicken intended for the domestic market. 
The threat point of the retailer can take different values depending on who owns the import 
licenses and whether imports are part of the negotiations. We first assume that the retailer owns 
the import licenses and that its threat point is zero. Second, in the absence of an agreement with 
the processor, the retailer could import chicken to the extent allowed by its import licenses and 
use its refrigerated counter space for other meat products. In that case the imports improve the 10 
bargaining position of the retailer. Finally, we consider that the processor owns all the import 
licenses and that its threat point remains zero in all negotiations. 
 
3.1. The retailer owns the import licenses and zero threat point 
When the retailer owns the import licenses and the rent from imports does not constitute a threat 
point, the profit of the retailer is given by 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , 1 1 r p w r p P Q Q p Q p Q c Q p Q π γ γ γ γ    = + + − − − +         
where  ( ) ( ) 1 1 P Q A BQ γ γ + ≡ − +       is  the  inverse  consumer  demand  for  chicken,  Q  is  the 
domestic production and γ  is the share of the domestic production imported under the minimum 
access commitment such that  ( ) 1 Q γ +  is the total quantity of chicken marketed.  p p  is the price 
paid to the domestic processor,  w p  is the price paid for the imported product inclusive of the in-
tariff  and  r c   is  the  constant  marginal  cost  of  the  retailer.  Because  the  over-quota  tariff  is 
prohibitive, the minimum access commitment  Q γ  acts like a binding import quota.  
  The profit of the processor is 
  ( ) , , p p f p f p p c Q p Q p p π   − − =     (1) 
where  p c  is the constant marginal cost and  f p  is the farm price. The price  p p  is negotiated with 
the retailer in the last stage while the price paid to the farmer,  f p , is negotiated with the farmer 
in the first stage. Q is determined in the second stage. As a result,  f p and Q are known by all 
when  p p  is negotiated.  
  The Nash product with zero threat points for the negotiation for the price paid to the 









        ,   
where δ  and 1 δ −  are respectively the bargaining weights of the retailer and the processor The 
solution to the first order condition yields the conditional processor price 
  ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 , 1 1 1 p f r w p f p Q p A c BQ p c p γ γ γ δ δ   = − + − + − − + +     (2) 
which is decreasing in the retailer’s marginal cost, the world price and domestic production, but 
increasing in the processor’s marginal cost and the fraction that can be imported by the retailer. 11 
Moving to the second stage of the model, we can insert (2) into (1) and maximize over 
domestic production to determine the profit maximizing quantity for the processor. The quantity 
presented for approval at the CFC board by the processor is given by 




p r f w
p f





+ − − + − −
  =   +
.   
Recall that domestic production is voted by a producers’ dominated CFC board. Therefore, we 
must not only consider the processor’s desired domestic production but also the farmer’s desired 
domestic production. The farmer maximizes its profit given by 
  ( ) , f f f f Q p p c Q π   = −     (3) 
where  f c   is  a  constant  marginal/average  cost.  This  implies  that  the  unconstrained  profit-
maximizing quantity  f f Q p     of the farmer is infinity when the profit margin is not negative. 
Even  though  the  CFC  is  dominated  by  producers,  the  institution  would  not  be  viable  if 
processors were to incur systematic losses. In our model, this implies that the farmer must set a 












  ∂   − + =
∂
,   
where  µ  is the Lagrange multiplier and the expression for  , p f Q p π      is found by inserting (2) 
in (1). The desired domestic production by the farmer systematically exceeds the processor’s 
desired quantity because 
,
0
p f Q p
Q
π   ∂   <
∂
 as long as  f f p c >  and hence  f f p f Q p Q p     >     . 
This is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Table 1 where the domestic allocation 
voted by the CFC board systematically lies between the CPEDC and the CFC desired quantities.  
  Because of our linear demand assumption and constant marginal cost, the quantity that 
makes the processor’s profit nil is twice the processor’s desired quantity 





r p f w
f f





− + − − −
  =   +
.   
Consistent with the data in Table 1, we assume that the observed quantity is a weighted average 
of the desired processor’s quantity and the one that makes the processor’s profit zero  12 
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− + − − −  
  = ∈     +  
.  (4) 
The parameter φ is a relative bargaining power parameter.  If  1 φ =  then  p f f Q Q p p     =     but 
if  2 φ =  then  f f f Q Q p p     =    . Hence, a high (low) φ  favors the farmer (processor).  
Recall that the price of live chicken is based on the price determined under the Ontario 
system.  The  price  of  live  chicken  in  Ontario  is  fixed  using  a  formula  that  accounts  for  the 
producers’  input  cost  and  a  profit  margin.  Producers  and  processors  periodically  meet  to 
negotiate the profit margin allocated to producers. We do not model the profit margin but rather, 
and equivalently, we solve for the price paid to the farmer by the processor. We use the Nash 
bargaining solution to obtain the farm price (price of live chicken) using  ( ) 0,1 σ ∈ and 1 σ −  as 
the weights on the farmer’s and the processor’s profits. We assume for the time being that the 








        ,   
where the expression for  p f p π     and  f f p π     are found by plugging the solutions for Q and 
p p  into (1) and (3) respectively. We find that the negotiated price is given by 
  ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1 1 1
2
r p w f
f
A c c p c
p
γ γ σ σ − + − − − + +
= .  (5) 
The equilibrium farm price paid to the farmer is increasing in the farmer’s marginal cost  f c , the 
intercept of the retail demand A, the proportion γ  of domestic production that can be imported, 
and decreasing in the world price  w p  and in the processor’s bargaining power σ . We find the 
equilibrium domestic production by inserting (5) into (4) and find 












  − + − − −
= +  
+    
.  (6) 
We  can  now  investigate  the  incidence  of  trade  liberalization  when  imports  and  domestic 
production are linked through the TRQ.   
 13 
Proposition 1: Provided that the retailer has all of the import licenses, that profits from imports 
do not constitute a negotiation threat point and that  w p f p c c > + , then the domestic price of 
chicken  rises  in  response  to  an  increase  in  the  regulated  ratio  γ   of  imports  to  domestic 
production and the Metzler paradox arises.   
 
Proof: The domestic price is inversely related to the total quantity marketed which is obtained 
by multiplying (6) by ( ) 1 γ + . The Metzler paradox arises when the following is negative 
  ( )
2
( )(1 ) 1
4 (1 )




+ − + ∂ +
=
∂ +
,  (7) 
which requires  w p f p c c > +  for the total quantity marketed to decline.  QED 
    
The  intuition  behind  the  above  proposition  is  that  the  ratio  of  imports  to  domestic 
production increases sourcing costs of the supply chain when  w p f p c c > +  and hence shrinks the 
gains to be negotiated in the various stages of the game. The “forced imports” bring about a large 
enough reduction in domestic supply to increase the farm price in (5). The Metzler result clearly 
hinges on the quota part of the TRQ being a minimum access commitment and on being linked 
to  domestic  production.  It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  joint  producer-processor-retailer  profit 
decreases with the imports-domestic production ratio if  w p f p c c > + . As such, it would be jointly 
profitable  if  retailers  could  “sleep”  on  the  import  licenses,  as  in  Cunha  and  Santos  (1996). 
However, as long as  p w p p > , the retailer would use the licenses.  
 
3.2. What if the imports are the retailer’s threat point? 
The rent from import licenses is a potential threat point when the retailer controls all of the 
import licenses. We analyze the implications of that threat point in what follows. We find the 
price paid to the processor by maximizing the Nash product 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
1
, , 1 , ,
p
r p r w p p r p Max p Q p P Q p Q p Q p
δ δ
π γ γ π
−
    − + −         .   
Simplifying this expression yields  
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Observe  that  imports  given  by  the  product  of  γ   and  Q  are  no  longer  directly  part  of  the 
negotiation because imports only impact negotiation through a change in the price paid to the 
retailer. The steps to solve the model are the same as for Proposition 1.  
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the ratio γ  of imports to domestic production has no impact on 
the retail price when the import license’s rents constitute the threat point of the retailer in its 
negotiation with the processor. 
 
Proof: Even though import rents are taken out of the retailer’s profit in the Nash product for the 
retailer-processor negotiation, the Nash product is still function of γ  because imports set aside 
from the negotiation still impact on the domestic retail price. Maximizing the Nash product we 
find  that  the  conditional  price  paid  to  the  processor  is 












  =   +
,  depend  on  γ ,  but  the  negotiated  farm  price, 




f p r f p A c c c σ σ = − − − + +   does  not.  Inserting  the  solution  for  f p   into  f Q p     
gives us the equilibrium domestic production Q and multiplying by  ( ) 1 γ + , we can show that 







, as the increase in γ  is 
fully offset by the decrease in domestic production.  QED 
 
Intuitively,  if  the  rents  from  import  licenses  are  shielded  from  the  negotiations,  trade 
liberalization should have a lesser impact on negotiated prices and quantities. Still imports affect 
the marginal revenue of the processor and the farm through a change in the price paid to the 
retailer. Because of the assumption of constant marginal costs, the change of price at retail is 
reflected by a proportional change in the marginal revenue for the processor and the farm which 
cause the domestic production to fall by the same quantity that is imported. 
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3.3. What if the processor controls the import licenses? 
The retailer’s profit when the import rents accrue to the processor is 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 r r p A BQ c p Q π γ γ = − + − − + ,   
while the processor’s profit is 
  ( ) ( ) 1 p p f w p p p p c Q π γ γ = + − − − .   
Because Canadian firms import mostly frozen chicken, we consider that the processor imports 
eviscerated chicken to be later sold to the retailer without additional processing.
8 The steps to 
obtain equilibrium quantities and prices remain as before.  We assume that the import rent of the 
processor is not a threat point in the negotiation with the farmer. The conditional price paid to the 
processor is 
  ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 1
, 1 1 1 1
1
p f r p f p w p Q p A c BQ c p c p γ δ δ γ δ γ γ
γ
  = − + − − − + + + + +   +
. 
The negotiated conditional domestic production is  




r f p w
f






− + − − +
  =   +
,  (8) 
and the negotiated farm price is 
  ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1 1 1
2
r p w f
f
A c c p c
p
γ γ σ σ − + − − − + +
= .  (9) 
Finally, by inserting (9) into (8) we find the solution for the domestic production: 











− + − − − +
=
+
.  (10) 
We can then state whether trade liberalization can induce a Metzler effect when import licenses 
are all allocated to the processor. 
 
Proposition 3: An increase in the ratio γ  of imports to domestic production when the import 
licenses are controlled by the processor induces the Metzler paradox if  w f p p c c > +  .  
Proof: Multiplying (10) by ( ) 1 γ +  and deriving with respect to γ , we find 
                                                 
8 In 2008, 0.2% of the share of import permits was allocated for the import of live chicken, 0.02% for whole 
eviscerated chicken, 80.5% for chicken parts and 19% for further processed chicken.  16 










+ − + ∂ +
=
∂ +
,  (11) 
which is negative only if  w f p p c c > +  as asserted.  QED              
The condition that makes (11) negative is the same that makes (7) negative in Proposition 
1 because the sole processor imports chicken, but does not process it. As our simulations show in 
the next section, the allocation of import licenses matters when the number of processors and 
retailers differ. Furthermore, the condition for a Metzler paradox changes if licenses are used to 
import live chicken instead of eviscerated chicken. In this case, both domestic and imported 
chicken  would  require  processing  and  the  “competitive”  condition  required  for  the  Metzler 
paradox  would  no  longer  involve  processing  costs.  Defining 
L
w p   as  the  world  price  for  live 
chicken and recalling that  f c is the domestic unit cost of production of live chicken, we can state 
that:     
 
Corollary:  If  the  processor  imports  live  chicken,  the  condition  supporting  a  Metzler  effect 
depends only on the relative sourcing cost of live chicken: 
L
w f p c > .     
 
As before, the Metzler effect arises because the negative impact of more expensive imports can 
be mitigated by cutting enough production to increase the domestic price. This peculiar outcome 
depends on 1) the quota component of the TRQ being directly linked to domestic production; 2) 
agents along the supply chain having market power; 3) the domestic industry having relatively 
low production costs.  
The conditions above are derived for Canada’s supply managed chicken industry, but 
supply management is not a necessary condition for the Metzler paradox to arise. We can find 
similar conditions with other market structures and other marketing system than the one in this 
model. For instance, a model with a competitive retail sector holding the import license and a 
monopolized  domestic  production  sector  would  generate  similar  results.  Our  simplifying 
assumptions of linear demand and constant marginal costs are not paramount for the Metzler 
paradox to occur. 
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4. Simulations of the effects of TRQ Liberalization on Canada’s Supply Managed Chicken 
Industry 
We use simulations from a more general model based on 2008 industry statistics to gauge by 
how much domestic prices could rise as a result of trade liberalization. We also discuss welfare 
implications. 
 
4.1. The simulation model 
The simulation model is a generalization of the model in the previous section. The model in this 
section  considers  N   identical  retailers,  M   identical  processors  and  many  identical  farmers 
represented by an assiciation. The model assumes arrangements between each processors and 
each retailers (i.e. each processor sells to the  N  retailers and analogously and each retailer buys 
from the  M  processors). Retailers and processors bargain over the price of eviscerated chicken 
in  MN   different  negotiations.  For  generality,  we  define  r θ   as  an  indicator  of  whether  the 
retailers' imports constitute a threat point in the negotiation with the processors. If the rent from 
chicken  imports  is  not a  threat  point,  then  1 r θ = .  Conversely,  if  all  the  retailers’  rent  from 
chicken imports is a threat point, then  0 r θ = . We also define  λ  as the share of total import 
licenses allocated to retailers. The remaining share is allocated among processors. 
  We use the Nash solution to describe the outcome of retailer-processor negotiations. The 
Nash product for a particular retailer-processor pair is ( ) ( )
1





  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
1 1
1 1 1 1 r p p p r w r P Q p c P Q p c Q
N M
π λ γ γ θ λγ γ = + − + − − + + − −         ,    
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
1 1
1 1 1 p r p f w p p p p c Q
N M
π λ γ λ γ = + − − − − − .   
The solution for the price paid to processors for eviscerated chicken is given by 











+ + +       =   + −
,  (12) 
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 w p r r w r R p c c p c δ λ γ δ λ γ θ λγ ≡ − + − − + − + +   and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 r S δ λ γ θ λγ ≡ − + − + .   18 
  The desired quantity by farms, under the processors' profitability constraint is  f f Q p     
and the desired domestic production of processors is  p f Q p    . It might be tempting to assume 
that processors act as a cartel exerting monopoly power. However, studies of demand for meat in 
Canada show that the elasticity of demand for chicken is inelastic and because a monopolist’s 
price-quantity pair must be in the elastic portion of the demand curve and the demand faced by 
processors  is  more  inelastic  than  the  demand  faced  by  retailers,  cartel-like  behavior  is 
inconsistent  with  the  empirical  evidence.
9  Therefore,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that 
processors have Cournot conjectures in announcing their desired quantities to provincial boards 
which relay the information to the CFC board. Inserting the solution of the price paid by retailers 
for eviscerated chicken as a function of the domestic production allocated to the processor into 
the profit of a representative risk neutral processor, we find 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , 1 1 1 p p f f w p p Q p p p c q π λ γ λ γ   = + − − − − −   , 
where  q is the desired domestic production for one processor. The first order condition with 
respect to q implicitly defines  f q p     , the desired domestic production by one processor: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
,
, 1 1 1 0
p f p
p f f p w
p Q p
q p Q p p c p
q q
π
λ γ λ γ
    ∂ ∂     = + + − − − − − =       ∂ ∂  
,  (13) 
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) , 1 1 1 p f p Q p q SB γ λ γ   ∂ ∂ = − + + −   . 
  We define  p f f Q p Mq p     ≡     as the total quantity desired by all the processors that is 
relayed to the CFC board. We know that the production target adopted by the CFC board is 
larger  or  equal  to  p f Q p    ,  but  smaller  or  equal  to  f f Q p    .  Thus,  we  denote  by 
( ) ,
f f f
p f Q p Q p Q p       ∈         the  domestic  production  approved  by  the  CFC  board.  In  the 
simulations, domestic production is determined by the desired domestic production plus a fixed 
percentage  calculated  from  past  observed  desired  quantities.  This  method  is  equivalent  to 
weighing the desired quantities of farmers and processors.  
                                                 
9 Eales (1996) finds an elasticity for chicken in Canada of -0.45 while Moschini (2001) finds an elasticity of -0.92. 
Lambert et al. (2006) find that the elasticity of demand in different regions of Canada to be around -1. 19 
  Unlike in the previous section, we consider that the threat point of processors may be 
different from zero when negotiating with the producers’ association. For generality, we define 
the parameter  { } 0,1 p θ ∈  as an indicator of whether the rent from the import of  chicken by 
processors that is a threat in the negotiation for the price of live chicken. The equilibrium farm 
price is negotiated by the processors’ representative and the farmers’ representative. Maximizing 
the Nash product 
1
, p f f
σ σ π π
−  where the processors’ profit is 
  ( ) ( )( ) , , , 1 p f p f f f p f p p f f w f p Q p p p c Q p p Q p p p Q p π θ λ γ             = − − + − −              
and the farmers’ profit is 
  ( ) f f f f p c Q p π   = −   
we obtain the implicit solution through the first order condition 
  ( )
,
, 1 0
p f f f
p f






.   (14) 
 
4.2. Calibration of the model 
We calibrate the model using data for 2008 and parameters estimates from the literature. Table 3 
shows the data and parameter estimates that serve as the basis for the calibration.  To account for 
uncertainty about the true value of parameters, we rely on subjective distributions summarized in 
Table 4. We calibrate the model considering that domestic production, total consumption and the 
share of import licenses allocated to retailers are constant parameters. The other parameters, 
which are less precisely observed, are considered random. As in Gervais and Surprenant (2003), 
we assume that 58% of the import licenses are controlled by retailers. We obtained domestic 
production, the price paid to farmers, and the wholesale price  from the Chicken Farmers of 
Canada (2009). We computed consumption as 107.5% of production to be consistent with the 
TRQ rule and the evidence presented in Table 1.  
  All  random  parameters  are  independently  distributed  and  drawn  from  affine 
transformations of beta distributions. Consider a random parameter  [ ] , x x x ∈ . The distribution 
of  x is given by  ( ) ( ) , x x x x a b β + − ∼ , where  ( ) ( ) , 0,1 a b β ∈  is the beta distribution and a and 
b are scale parameters. The mean of the beta distribution is given by  ( ) a a b +  and the mean of 20 
x is therefore given by  [ ] ( ) ( ) E x x x x a a b = + − + .  For a given value of  a, we can find the 
value of b that yields a mean  x
∗: 







. We set the value of a to five which assures 
us,  given  the  mean,  min  and  max  of  the  parameters  in  our  model,  that  1 b >   and  that  the 
distribution  of  x  is  bell  shaped.  The  variance  of  x  is  given  by: 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 1 V x x x ab a b a b = − + + + . 
Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009) reports retail prices for broilers, breast, wings, legs 
and drums. Our model treats chicken as a homogenous product. We must therefore calculate a 
retail price index. We obtained from the Australian Chicken Meat Federation (2007) the weight 
shares of chicken parts. We use these shares to compute the average value of a chicken sold by 
parts. Using the price of breast, wings, legs and drums with the corresponding weight shares, we 
find an average retail price of $8.58 per kg.
10 This price is much higher than the price of a broiler 
($5.75 per kg), but much lower than the price of breast ($15.17 per kg). The weight shares do not 
correspond to consumption shares because Canadians prefer white meat over dark meat: Canada 
is an importer of chicken breasts and an exporter of chicken legs. Given that Canadians favor 
more expensive breasts over cheaper legs, the average value of a chicken sold by parts should be 
higher than $8.58 per kg. We conservatively account for the uncertainty over the retail price by 
treating the retail price as a random parameter distributed between $6.00 per kg and $12.00 per 
kg, with a mean of $9.00 per kg. 
We compute the farm price by dividing total cash farm price receipt by total production 
of eviscerated chicken. We find a farm price of $1.95 per kg of eviscerated weight. Given that 
Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009) reports an average price paid to farms of $1.44 per kg of live 
weight, this implies that one kg of live chicken yields 0.736 kg of eviscerated chicken. The farm 
price is distributed between $1.85 per kg and $2.05 per kg with a mean of $1.95. Similarly, based 
on the value of reported by Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009), we consider that the price paid to 
processors is distributed between $2.90 per kg and $3.16 per kg with a mean of $3.03 per kg. 
We approximate the price of imported chicken by calculating the average unit value of 
chicken  imported  from  the  United  States.  The  US  International  Trade  Commission  (2010) 
collects  data  on  all  US  imports  and  exports.  We  collected  the  quantities  and  values  of  US 
                                                 
10 Unless stated otherwise, prices are quoted in Canadian dollars per pound of eviscerated weight.  21 
chicken exports to Canada at the 6-digit HTS codes 020711, 020712, 020713, 020714 (meat and 
edible offal of poultry, fresh, chill or frozen chicken) for 2008 and calculate a unit value of $US 
2.12 per kg. Once  converted in Canadian dollars using the  exchange rate from the  Bank of 
Canada (2009), we obtain an import price of $2.26 per kg. The import price is allowed to vary 
between $2.00 per kg and $2.50 per kg in the simulations. 
The elasticity of demand is also specified as a random parameter. Based on estimates 
reported in the literature and the -0.8 estimate used in Gervais and Surprenant (2003), we assume 
that the elasticity of demand is distributed between -1.10 and -0.45 with a mean of -0.80. As for 
the  marginal  cost  of  producing  chicken  in  Canada,  we  borrow  Rude  and  Gervais’s  (2006) 
marginal cost of $0.78 per kg of live weight. This measure equals $1.06 per kg of eviscerated 
weight. We assume that the marginal cost of farms is distributed between $0.86 and $1.50 with a 
mean of $1.05 per kg of eviscerated weight. From Gervais and Surprenant (2003), Gervais and 
Devadoss (2006) and Gervais, Guillemette and Romain (2007), the marginal cost of processors is 
allowed  to  vary  between  $0.35  per  kg  and  $1.00  per  kg  with  a  mean  of  $0.60  per  kg  of 
eviscerated weight. The marginal cost of retailers takes the same mean value, but varies from a 
minimum of $0.25 per kg to a maximum of $1.10 per kg. 
We contend that if the rent from imports is not a threat point in the negotiation between 
retailers and processors, it is not a threat point in the negotiation between the processors’ and 
farmers’  associations.  This  means  that  we  must  consider  two  cases:  A) 1 r p θ θ = =   and  B)
0 r p θ θ = = . Under case A, threat points are zero while in case B import rents are the threat 
points. From the equations of the model, we can recover the parameters δ , M and σ . We do not 
need to recover the number of retailers  N as the results of the model are independent of the 
number of retailers because of the assumptions that retailers are identical, have constant marginal 
cost and that each retailer bargains with each processor. We begin by finding the bargaining 
power of retailers, δ , consistent with equation (12). We consider that the domestic allocation is 
based on the desired quantity by processors and use equation (13) that describes the desired 
quantity  by  processor  to  find  the  number  of  processors,  M .  The  calibration  considers  that 
processors desired quantity is 1.7% short of the domestic allocation, as per the data in Table 1. 
Finally, we use equation (14) that implicitly defines the price paid to farms to recover the value 
of the bargaining power of processors, σ , in the negotiation over the farm price. 22 
We  simulate  the  model  10,000  times  for  each  of  the  two  cases.  Figure  1  shows  the 
distribution of the calibrated parameters  δ ,  M and  σ . The mean of the bargaining power of 
retailers, δ , is robust across cases at about 0.91, meaning that retailers capture most of the rent 
in their negotiations with processors over the price of eviscerated chicken. The mean number of 
processors,  M , is not affected by the assumption about threat points and is approximately equal 
to 1.86 which reflects the highly concentrated nature of food processing in Canada. The mean of 
the bargaining power of processors when bargaining with farmers, σ , is 0.91 when threat points 
are zero and 0.85 in the alternative case. Gervais and Devadoss (2006) find a similar result. We 
consider in the simulations below that imports are allowed to increase from 7.5% to 12.5% of 
domestic production and that the over-quota tariff remains prohibitive. 
 
4.3. Scenario 1: Increase in the import-production ratio without changing in allocation shares 
In this first scenario, we consider that  γ  increases, but that  λ  remains constant. We use our 
calibrated model to find the effect of that increase on the price paid to farmers, the domestic 
production of chicken, the price paid to processors and the price paid to retailers by consumers. 
Recall that case A considers that all the rents from imports are part of the negotiations while case 
B considers that imports rents are excluded from the negotiation. Figure 2 shows that for case A 
that the price paid to farmers, the price paid to processors and the price paid to retailers increase 
on average. In case B all prices decrease. Domestic production decreases in both cases. Under 
case A all the rent from imports are part of the negotiations. Given the distributions of the cost 
parameters and the world price, we observe a Metzler effect. The maximum increase in the retail 
price is 0.4%.  We do not observe a Metzler effect under case B as the decrease in the retail price 
varies between 0.5% and 3%. Large negative changes are also simulated for the prices paid to 
processors  and  the  price  paid  to  farmers.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  propositions 
derived previously. 
 
4.4. Scenario 2: Increase in the import-production ratio and more licenses allocated to retailers 
In the second scenario, we consider that only the retailers are allowed to import more chicken 
after market liberalization.  This means that we can write that the imports of processors remain 
constant such that  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
f f Q Q λ γ λ γ − = − , where superscripts 0 and 1 respectively indicate 
before  and  after  the  change  in  the  import  licenses  has  occurred.  The  new  share  of  licenses 23 
allocated to retailers is approximately given by  ( ) 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.748 λ λ γ γ = − − = , with  0 0.58 λ = , 
0 0.075 γ =  and  1 0.125 γ = . The simulations therefore assume that the import-production ratio 
goes up from 0.075 to 0.125 and that the share of import licenses allocated to retailers goes up 
from 0.58 to 0.685. The simulations results are presented in Figure 3. Under case B, the farm 
price, the price paid to processors and the retail price do not change and the increase in imports is 
matched by a decrease in production of the same size because of our linear demand and constant 
marginal cost assumptions (as in proposition 2). The rent from imports is not part of negotiations 
and therefore cannot be captured by upstream firms. Hence market liberalization with import 
licenses  allocated  to  retailers  do  not  affect  retailers-processors  and  processors-farmers 
negotiations. This is unlike case B in scenario 1 where processors sell more imported chicken to 
retailers.  Under  the  current  scenario,  processors  are  not  allowed  to  import  a  larger  share  of 
domestic production after trade liberalization. The rents from the additional licenses accrue to the 
retailers.  Because  imports  displace  domestic  production,  there  is  a  smaller  pie  to  share  for 
processors and farmers. In case A, processors can capture part of the rent from the import of 
chicken by retailers. As a result, the price paid to processors increases and the price of live 
chicken also increases. Domestic production decreases enough to more than offset the increase in 
the import-production ratio and to cause a Metzler effect. Comparing scenarios 1 and 2, we  
conclude that import license allocations do matter in the more general version of our model. 
 
4.5. Scenario 3: Increase in imports licenses with all more licenses allocated to processors 
This  third  scenario  is  about  an  increase  in  the import-production  ratio  with  an  allocation  of 
licenses  skewed  toward  processors.  The  retailers’  imports  remain  constant  such  that 
1 1 1 0 0 0
f f Q Q λγ λ γ = . Assuming that the change in domestic production is small, we can write that 
0 0 1 0.348 λ γ γ = . As before, we consider that the import-production ratio goes up from 0.075 to 
0.125 but that the share of import licenses allocated to retailers goes down from 0.58 to 0.348. 
Figure 4 shows a Metzler effect under case A as the price paid to retailer goes up. Under case B, 
we observe a large decrease in the farm price and a somewhat smaller decrease in the price paid 
to processors. Two reasons are behind this. First, the import licenses cause processors to reduce 
their desired domestic production. However, the negative change in domestic production is small 
and the total quantity of chicken marketed increases, which yields a decrease in the price paid to 24 
retailers. Second, trade liberalization favoring import by processors means that processors do not 
demand as much chicken from domestic farmers. Since import rents are the threat point and 
import rents cannot be passed on to farmers, the price paid to farmers decreases.   
 
4.6. Trade liberalization, welfare and profits 
Consumer  surplus  and  welfare  is  a  decreasing  function  of  the  price  paid  to  retailers.  Thus, 
whenever trade liberalization induces a Metzler effect, welfare decreases. We will focus on TRQ 
liberalization scenario 2, where more import licenses are allocated to retailers, to analyze profit 
changes along the supply chain.  Scenario 2 generates more modest changes in the price paid to 
farmers under case B than the other scenarios. Figure 5 shows the changes in profits. In all cases 
the mean profit of firms decreases. Recall that imported chicken sourcing cost must be larger 
than domestic chicken for Metzler effects to be observed. As a result, forcing a larger import-
production ratio on the supply chain can only reduce profit. Retailers are those that are the least 
affected, especially under case B because its import rent are not shared. The changes in the profit 
of processors in panel 2) of figure 5 and the changes in the profit of farmers in panel 3) are 
almost  identical.  The  changes  in  profit  range  from  minus  2%  to  almost  minus  6%.  Unlike 
retailers, profits of processors and farmers decrease more under case A, because of the large 
decrease in domestic production.  
 
Conclusion 
Even though the Metzler paradox is discussed in virtually all international trade textbooks (e.g. 
Bhagwati, Panagaryia and Srinivassan 1998 and Bowen, Hollander and Viane 1998), it is often 
seen as a theoretical curiosity of little empirical significance. We show theoretically and through 
numerical simulations that the liberalization of Canada’s supply managed chicken industry is 
likely to induce domestic prices increases because of the manner with which the minimum access 
commitment of the Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) is set up.  The liberalization of supply managed 
industries has attracted much attention in academic (e.g., Alston and Spriggs, 1998; Rude and 
Gervais, 2006) and non-academic circles (Gifford, 2005) in part because of the domestic and 
trade  distortions  created  by  supply  managed  programs  and  the  resolve  of  the  Canadian 
government to defend these programs at the WTO. If all supply managed products could remain 
designated  as  sensitive,  they  could  be  exempt  from  significant  tariff  reductions.  Sensitive 25 
products are protected by TRQs which are usually set to mimic import quotas, with low in-quota 
tariffs and high over-quota tariffs. TRQs came about as a compromise on the tariffication of non-
tariff barriers in the Uruguay Round because historical market access levels were threatened by 
highly restrictive proposed tariffs. The quota part of the TRQ on Canada’s chicken import is a 
minimum access commitment defined as a fraction of domestic production. Under a hypothetical 
Doha Agreement, sensitive products would still be subject to trade liberalization, but the bulk of 
the adjustment would be on the quota part of the TRQ. For Canada’s chicken industry, this 
would mean that a larger fraction of domestic production could be imported. We show that trade 
liberalization of this sort could induce perverse responses known as Metzler effects.    
  We develop a 3-stage theoretical model that captures the main institutional features of the 
supply-managed chicken supply chain to derive conditions under which the Metzler paradox. 
The  model  innovates  by  considering  the  retailers-processors  and  processors-farmers  price 
negotiations  in  addition  to  the  domestic  output  determination.  We  also  investigate  the 
implications of import license allocation between retailers and processors as well as the scope of 
the negotiations/threat points. A more general version of the model is calibrated using 2008 data 
and is then used to simulate 3 different liberalization scenarios for Canada’s chicken supply 
chain.  In  the  process,  we  find  bargaining  weights  favoring  retailers  in  retailers-processors 
negotiations and processors in processors-farmers negotiations. We show that a Metzler paradox 
is quite plausible, taking the form of substantial increases in the prices paid to Canadian chicken 
farmers and processors and rather small retail price increases. The TRQ-driven Metzler effect 
could  arise  under  different  imperfectly  competitive  market  structures  and  marketing 
arrangements.    
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A-66*  151.4  144.5  146.7  141.7  4.5%  1.5%  -2.0% 
A-67  143.3  139.7  140.4  140.8  2.5%  0.5%  0.8% 
A-68  142.7  136.0  136.8  142.9  4.7%  0.6%  4.8% 
A-69  139.1  133.0  135.8  139.6  4.4%  2.1%  4.7% 
A-70*  145.5  142.0  143.4  143.6  2.4%  1.0%  1.1% 
A-71  147.4  143.0  143.0  144.1  3.0%  0.0%  0.8% 
A-72*  151.4  144.1  147.6  146.6  4.8%  2.4%  1.7% 
A-73  145.6  138.0  139.2  137.9  5.2%  0.9%  -0.1% 
A-74  141.8  138.0  139.3  142.8  2.7%  1.0%  3.4% 
A-75  139.0  133.1  136.5  136.1  4.2%  2.5%  2.2% 
A-76  147.1  143.0  144.6  145.2  2.8%  1.1%  1.5% 
A-77  147.5  143.0  145.4  144.4  3.1%  1.7%  1.0% 
A-78  156.8  149.0  153.0  152.4  5.0%  2.7%  2.2% 
A-79*  153.8  148.0  151.8  147.6  3.8%  2.5%  -0.3% 
A-80  146.2  142.4  144.5  144.9  2.6%  1.5%  1.7% 
A-81  147.1  144.5  146.1  148.3  1.8%  1.1%  2.6% 
A-82  141.5  137.3  139.6  142.5  3.0%  1.7%  3.6% 
A-83  147.0  144.3  145.7  145.8  1.8%  1.0%  1.0% 
A-84  153.4  149.0  151.9  151.9  2.9%  2.0%  1.9% 
A-85  156.3  151.8  153.0  152.8  2.9%  0.8%  0.7% 
A-86  151.2  145.8  147.9  146.0  3.6%  1.5%  0.1% 
A-87*  149.0  141.0  146.7  -  5.4%  4.0%  - 
A-88  139.6  131.6  135.0  -  5.7%  2.6%  - 
A-89*  148.5  141.0  145.9  -  5.1%  3.5%  - 
Average  147.1  141.8  142.2  144.7  3.7%  1.7%  1.6% 
Note: * indicates a period where the CEPC has formulated a complaint to the National Farm 
Products Council over the domestic allocation approved by the CFC Board. Each period is eight 
weeks long. Period A-66 covered production between June 26 and August 20 of 2005. Period A-
89 covered production between January 4 and February 28 of 2009. The data were obtained from 
Farm Products Council of Canada (2009). 
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Total import permits 
in % of production 
2001  65 179  7.40 %  21 547  86 727  9.84 % 
2002  68 638  7.38 %  26 843  95 481  10.27 % 
2003  69 005  7.35 %  27 098  96 103  10.23 % 
2004  70 371  7.53 %  33 706  104 078  11.14 % 
2005  72 551  7.67 %  43 710  116 261  12.29 % 
2006  74 582  7.60 %  57 676  132 258  13.48 % 
2007  76 184  7.82 %  75 786  151 970  15.61 % 
Note: The data were obtained from Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009). The percentages are calculated as 
the share of imports with respect to the previous year production. 
 
 
Table 3: Data use as basis for model calibration 
Data  Source  Value 
Total farm cash receipt in 2008 ($000)  Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009)  1,987,926 
Production (000 kg)  Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009)  1,017,216 
Consumption (000 kg)  Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009)  1,047,946 
Price paid to farms ($ per kg of live weight)  Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009)  1.444 
Wholesale price – market composite ($ per kg)  Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009)  3.03 
Retail price for broilers ($ per kg)  Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009)  5.749  
Retail price for breast ($ per kg)  Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009)  15.17 
Retail price for wings ($ per kg)  Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009)  8.14 
Retail price for legs ($ per kg)  Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009)  5.27 
Retail price for drums ($ per kg)  Chicken Farmers of Canada (2009)  5.78 
Weight share of breast  Australian Chicken Meat Federation (2007)  0.41 
Weight share of wings  Australian Chicken Meat Federation (2007)  0.12 
Weight share of legs  Australian Chicken Meat Federation (2007)  0.31 
Weight share of drums  Australian Chicken Meat Federation (2007)  0.17 
Import of chicken from the US (000 kg)  US International Trade Commission (2010)  242,422 
Import of chicken from the US ($US 000)  US International Trade Commission (2010)  114,555 
Annual average exchange rate ($US/$Can)  Bank of Canada (2009)  1.066 
Marginal cost of farms ($ per kg of live weight)  Rude and Gervais (2006)  0.78 
Marginal cost of processors ($ per kg)  Gervais and Surprenant (2003)  0.89 
Elasticity of demand  Gervais and Surprenant (2003)  -0.80 
Share of import licenses allocated to retailers  Gervais and Surprenant (2003)  0.58 
Note: All prices and quantities are expressed in terms of eviscerated weight except for the price paid to farms.  
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Table 4: Parameter values in the calibrated model 
Constant parameters 
Parameter  Description  Value 
Q  Domestic production (000 kg)  1,017,216 
( ) 1 Q γ +   Consumption (000 kg)  1,093,507 
λ  Share of retailers import licenses  0.58 
Random parameters 
Parameter  Description  Min  Mean  Max  Variance 
( ) 1 P Q λ +       Retail price ($ per kg)  6.00  9.00  12.00  0.081 
p p   Wholesale price ($ per kg)  2.90  3.03  3.16  0.002 
f p   Price paid to farms ($ per kg)  1.85  1.95  2.05  0.001 
w p   Import price ($ per kg)  2.00  2.26  2.50  0.006 
η   Elasticity of demand  -1.10  -0.80  -0.45  0.009 
f c   Marginal cost of farms ($ per kg)  0.60  1.05  1.50  0.019 
p c   Marginal cost of processors ($per kg)  0.35  0.60  1.00  0.007 
r c   Marginal cost of retailers ($ per kg)  0.15  0.60  1.10  0.020 
Note: All prices and quantities are expressed in terms of eviscerated weight 
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Note: the vertical dashed lines indicate the mean of parameters. 
Figure 1: Distribution of parameters calibrated from the model 
 33 
 
Note: the vertical dashed lines indicate the mean of percentage changes. 
Figure 2: Percentage change in prices and domestic production when import licenses increase but 
the allocation of licenses remains the same 34 
 
Note: the vertical dashed lines indicate the mean of percentage changes. 
Figure 3: Percentage change in prices and domestic production when import licenses increase 
and more import licenses go to retailers 35 
 
Note: the vertical dashed lines indicate the mean of percentage changes. 
Figure 4: Percentage change in prices and domestic production when import licenses increase 
and more import licenses go to processors 36 
 
Note: the vertical dashed lines indicate the mean of percentage changes. 
Figure 5: Percentage change in profits when import licenses increase and more import 
licenses go to retailers (scenario 2) 